Oral Arguments, with Context

The Federal Circuit considers Jefferson Street Holdings' appeal from reexamination, the Patent Office's review of an already granted protective smartphone-case patent. The case is designed to shield the phone while leaving its screen accessible, using higher edges at the ends and lower edges along the sides. The patent's claims, its written boundaries of protection, describe a lower side-edge height that is continuous between two transitions. The key question is whether that height must stay constant, or may vary as long as the side remains above zero. That interpretation affects comparison with earlier case designs relied on as prior art. The judges also examine obviousness: whether the claimed arrangement would have been obvious to a skilled designer at the time. A claim can fail that test even without an identical earlier disclosure. So interpreting continuous more narrowly would not, by itself, decide whether making the side height constant was obvious.

In re Jefferson Street Holdings LLC (No. 25-1661) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording:
https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1661_11022026.mp3

Case and argument date — Federal Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026:
https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/

Technology and claim language — issued U.S. Patent 11,399,606 B2:
https://patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/8e/d3/ae/a9116686af80db/US11399606.pdf

Patent-to-appeal cross-reference — Google Patents litigation metadata:
https://patents.google.com/patent/US11399606B2/en

Obviousness — 35 U.S.C. § 103:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/35/103

Reexamination requests — 35 U.S.C. § 302:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/35/302

Court review after reexamination — 35 U.S.C. § 306:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/35/306

The Federal Circuit reviews LPP Combustion's challenge to rulings in its patent dispute with General Electric. The patents address how fuel burns and how to prevent premature ignition. One patent uses an inert diluent, a lower-oxygen gas intended to keep fuel from igniting before the combustion chamber. The dispute is whether inert, or non-reactive, excludes every gas containing hydrocarbons, common fuel components. The trial court read the term to exclude those gases. LPP will argue that reactivity depends on the conditions, not just a gas's hydrocarbon content. Patent claims are the written statements that define what a patent protects; claim construction is interpreting them. The other issue involves two patents that sense fuel or combustion characteristics and trigger an additive to adjust combustion when a reading falls outside an acceptable range. The trial court held the challenged claims ineligible under Section one oh one: it viewed them as an abstract idea of sensing, comparing and adjusting without an additional inventive concept. Eligibility asks whether the claims satisfy the threshold for patent protection, not simply whether General Electric infringes. LPP will argue that the ordered combination is a specific technical improvement, even if individual components are conventional. General Electric will defend the court's reading of the gas limitation and its view that the other claims describe a generic feedback system.

General Electric Company v. LPP Combustion, LLC (No. 25-1821) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording:
https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1821_11022026.mp3

Case and argument date — Federal Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026:
https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/

Technology and inert-gas claim construction — D. Del. Doc. 66, September 6, 2023:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-ded-1_22-cv-00720/pdf/USCOURTS-ded-1_22-cv-00720-0.pdf

Section 101 judgment on the pleadings — D. Del. memorandum opinion and order, March 28, 2025:
https://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/ded/files/opinions/22-720_0.pdf

A Puerto Rico developer says the public water and sewer authority is using a privately built sewage pump station without paying the costs it imposes. The developer built the station for a residential project. A nearby housing community was then connected, sending additional wastewater through it. The developer says the authority refuses to take over the station, leaving it to pay for operation and maintenance while the authority continues collecting sewer fees. It filed a federal lawsuit in twenty twenty, seeking compensation and other relief. The Fifth Amendment requires the government to pay just compensation for private property taken for public use. The dispute includes whether the company has a protected property interest in the station, and whether the authority's conduct is a physical taking or instead a restriction on how property may be used. Physical takings concern occupation or appropriation of property; regulatory takings concern restrictions that go far enough to require compensation. There is also a statute-of-limitations question, the deadline for bringing a lawsuit. Does continued sewage flow keep the claim timely, or did the clock begin with government actions years earlier? Finally, the court will explore what process was available for the company to challenge the authority's refusal to accept the station and its repair demands.

Estancias de Cerro Mar, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (No. 25-1161) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official First Circuit recording:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/25-1161_20261102.mp3

Case and argument date — First Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11

Pump-station background and earlier housing-secretary ruling — D.P.R. Doc. 119, November 15, 2023:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-prd-3_20-cv-01664/pdf/USCOURTS-prd-3_20-cv-01664-1.pdf

Claimed operating burden and earlier preliminary-injunction ruling — D.P.R. Doc. 141, January 23, 2024:
https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/puerto-rico/prdce/3%3A2020cv01664/161839/141/0.pdf?ts=1706201712

Physical and regulatory takings — Supreme Court, Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, No. 20-107:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/20-107

A federal prisoner's effort to finish his sentence outside prison becomes a Supreme Court dispute over access to judicial review. Maxwell is serving a twenty-year sentence for racketeering and related offenses arising from a scheme to take over a mortgage-loan company and drain its assets. The First Step Act lets eligible prisoners earn time credits through qualifying programs and productive activities. Maxwell says his credits entitle him to move to home confinement or a halfway house, a supervised residence in the community. That would not erase his sentence: those placements still impose restrictions and remain under Bureau of Prisons control. To challenge his continued imprisonment, he filed a petition for habeas corpus, a procedure asking a court to examine whether custody is lawful. The district court dismissed his First Step Act claim because it found he had not properly presented it through the prison's administrative grievance process. The Fifth Circuit affirmed on a different ground: moving to home confinement or a halfway house would not amount to release from custody, so habeas was the wrong procedure. Maxwell will argue that leaving prison for a distinctly lower level of custody is precisely the kind of relief habeas can provide. The government agrees that the Fifth Circuit drew the line incorrectly, but it still raises other barriers, including administrative exhaustion and a statute limiting judicial review of prison placements. Agreement about the legal procedure is not agreement that Maxwell must be transferred now. The Court appointed an amicus curiae, a friend of the court, to argue in support of the judgment. He will maintain that these transfers change the conditions or location of imprisonment rather than end it. The practical question is whether a prisoner can use habeas to seek this move into the community, not whether Maxwell's underlying conviction was valid.

Maxwell v. Dinis (No. 25-5930) — Supreme Court of the United States, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official Supreme Court recording:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/media/audio/mp3files/25-5930.mp3

Official transcript — November 2, 2026:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2026/25-5930_4f14.pdf

Case, granted question and appointed amicus — Supreme Court docket No. 25-5930:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/25-5930.html

District court rulings and Fifth Circuit decision — petition appendix:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-5930/380263/20251022122808387_20251022-122353-00000694-00000144.pdf

Maxwell's factual account and habeas argument — petitioner merits brief:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-5930/418167/20260805123041240_25-5930%20opening%20brief%20final_PDFA.pdf

Government's position and remaining objections — respondent merits brief:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-5930/418232/20260805174545194_25-5930UnitedStates.pdf

Argument supporting the judgment — court-appointed amicus brief:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-5930/424858/20260918142656288_25-5930_Amicus%20Brief.pdf

Habeas corpus — 28 U.S.C. § 2241:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/2241

First Step Act earned time credits — 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4):
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3632

Prerelease custody — 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g):
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3624

Prison placement and reviewability — 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b):
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3621

The Federal Circuit reviews Jefferson Street Holdings' challenge to patent rejections involving a protective phone case. The design uses lower side edges alongside higher sections, intended to preserve screen access while protecting the device. The Patent Office reexamined the issued patent against earlier case designs, and its appeal board upheld the rejections now challenged in court. A patent claim defines the features for which protection is sought. Here, much turns on whether a height that continuously spans a side must stay constant, or may curve while never dropping to zero. The lawyers will compare differently worded claims, including dependent claims that add restrictions to a broader claim. That is claim differentiation: differences between claims can help determine their scope. Anticipation asks whether one earlier reference already disclosed every claimed feature in the required arrangement. Obviousness asks whether the claimed arrangement, as a whole, would have been an ordinary, predictable choice for someone skilled in the field, in light of earlier designs. The Patent Office will argue that making the side edges straight instead of curved was such a design choice. Jefferson Street will insist that the geometry has functional significance, combining protection with screen access, and that the office has not adequately justified the change. Winning the wording dispute alone may not defeat the separate obviousness grounds.

In re Jefferson Street Holdings LLC (No. 26-1008) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording, docket 26-1008:
https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/26-1008_11022026.mp3

Case and argument date — Federal Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026:
https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/

Patent background and reexamination ruling — PTAB Appeal 2025-000827, July 29, 2025, reproduced by CaseMine:
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/6889ab1877b6a5b6e3e1e0a7

Claim interpretation — USPTO Manual §2111:
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2111.html

Obviousness and changes in shape — USPTO Manual §2144:
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2144.html

The Federal Circuit considers patents for mobile-device location services asserted against Uber. The patents describe ways to request location data within geographic regions and determine whether devices are moving together. The patent owner says these methods address network overload and tracking problems. It sued Uber for infringement, but the district court dismissed the case without a trial, finding the patent claims ineligible because they covered abstract information processing rather than a technological improvement. A related appeal involving Lyft is being heard alongside it. Eligibility concerns what patent law protects, not simply whether an invention is new. A patent claim defines the invention's legal boundaries. Under the Supreme Court's Alice framework, a claim directed to an abstract idea needs an additional inventive concept to qualify, considering its elements both individually and together. Merely using ordinary computer components is not enough. The patent owner's lawyer will argue that geographic limits change how the network works and that the court overlooked differences among the claims. Uber will answer that selecting less location information is merely filtering, not a specific technical advance. Listen also for whether one representative claim can stand in for the rest, and whether the alleged technical improvements could be rejected at the pleading stage, before factual disputes were developed.

Enovsys LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (No. 25-1982) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording:
https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1982_11022026.mp3

Case and argument date — Federal Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026:
https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/

Case background and eligibility ruling — N.D. Cal. reconsideration order, June 30, 2025:
https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/california/candce/5%3A2023cv04549/417867/77/0.pdf

Consolidated Uber and Lyft appeals — appellate docket index:
https://dockets.justia.com/docket/circuit-courts/cafc/25-1982

Patent-eligible subject matter — 35 U.S.C. §101:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/35/101

Abstract ideas and inventive concept — Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/13-298

Motion to dismiss — Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6):
https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_12

The First Circuit considers when Puerto Rico can be sued over alleged police misconduct. A woman brought federal civil-rights and Puerto Rico tort claims alleging excessive force by police officers. She also sought to hold the Commonwealth and its police agency liable. The district court dismissed the claims against those government defendants on immunity grounds, without deciding whether the officers had used unlawful force. The appeal is being heard together with a second police-related case. The plaintiffs will ask the court to reconsider treating Puerto Rico like a state for sovereign immunity, a protection against being sued in federal court. They will rely on a Supreme Court decision about Puerto Rico's powers and double jeopardy, the constitutional protection against repeated prosecutions for the same offense. That criminal-law ruling did not itself decide this civil-immunity question. The judges will also focus on Section nineteen eighty-three, which allows suits for violations of federal rights by people acting under government authority. Whether Puerto Rico counts as a suable person under that law is distinct from its constitutional immunity. There is also a procedural hurdle: whether the challenged rulings are final enough to appeal now. The Commonwealth will argue that these appeals fail that requirement.

Roldan-Cruz v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (No. 24-1803) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official First Circuit consolidated hearing:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/24-1803_20261102.mp3

Case and argument date — First Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11

Lead-case background and dismissal — D.P.R. Opinion and Order, July 18, 2024:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-prd-3_24-cv-01101/pdf/USCOURTS-prd-3_24-cv-01101-0.pdf

Federal civil-rights remedy — 42 U.S.C. §1983:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1983

Final decisions and appeal — 28 U.S.C. §1291:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1291

Multiple-party judgments — Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b):
https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_54

Double-jeopardy context — Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/15-108

The Fifth Circuit considers whether federal Medicaid funding rules reach private agreements among hospitals. Texas allows local governments to tax healthcare providers to help finance its share of Medicaid, a joint federal-state healthcare program. Federal matching funds are added, and hospitals receive Medicaid payments. CMS, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, is targeting private agreements that redistribute those payments so taxpaying hospitals recover their tax costs. This is the hold-harmless issue: whether providers are being protected from the cost of the tax. CMS says private redistribution can amount to an indirect government guarantee. Texas says the statute requires a guarantee from the state or local government itself, not merely a private agreement. A district judge set aside the challenged rule provisions and bulletins, and the federal government now appeals. Its lawyer will argue that private intermediaries do not remove these arrangements from Congress's prohibition. Texas's lawyer will defend the district court's reading and argue that CMS changed its position without adequately explaining the shift. You will also hear about the major-questions doctrine, which calls for clear congressional authorization for extraordinary claims of agency power. If the ruling stands, how broadly should it operate? Vacatur means setting an agency action aside; the government will argue for relief limited to Texas rather than across the board.

State of Texas v. Oz (No. 25-40766) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official Fifth Circuit recording:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/25/25-40766_11-2-2026.mp3

Case and argument date — Fifth Circuit official recording archive:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/results?from=2026-08-01&to=2026-11-03

District court decision and funding background — September 24, 2025, Doc. 92:
https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/texas/txedce/6%3A2023cv00161/221363/92/0.pdf?ts=1758805152

Medicaid funding and hold-harmless provisions — 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w):
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1396b

Judicial review and setting aside agency action — 5 U.S.C. § 706:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/706

The Federal Circuit considers a dispute over antidumping calculations for mattresses from Indonesia. These duties are extra import charges addressing below-fair-value sales that materially harm or threaten a domestic industry. Some mattress models came from multiple countries, and Zinus's warehouse records could not trace every sale back to its origin. That mattered because Commerce needed to identify Indonesian sales, not all sales from the warehouse. The agency estimated the Indonesian share using quarterly ratios. After twice sending the calculations back to Commerce for further work, the Court of International Trade upheld the revised result. Brooklyn Bedding and other domestic producers and unions will seek another remand, meaning a return to the agency for further work. Their lawyer will argue that Commerce rejected some estimates as impossible while accepting inventory data with the same problem: sales apparently exceeding the available mattresses. The government and Zinus will defend the estimate as reasonable despite small anomalies in imperfect records. Substantial-evidence review asks whether the record adequately supports the agency's decision. Another dispute concerns the benchmark for components purchased from a related company rather than an independent seller. The panel will also consider whether new inventory information needed additional checking, and whether that objection was raised too late.

PT. Zinus Global Indonesia v. United States (No. 25-1674) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording:
https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1674_11022026.mp3

Case and argument date — Federal Circuit official recording index:
https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/

Prior trade-court decision and background — Slip Op. 25-15, February 18, 2025:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cit-1_21-cv-00284/pdf/USCOURTS-cit-1_21-cv-00284-0.pdf

Appeal parties and procedural entries — First-party court docket republished by Justia:
https://dockets.justia.com/docket/circuit-courts/cafc/25-1674

Antidumping duties — 19 U.S.C. § 1673:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/1673

Substantial-evidence review — 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b):
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/1516a

Related-party input valuation — 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(2)–(3):
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/1677b

Information and verification — 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(e), (i):
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/1677m

The First Circuit considers whether a Bitcoin prosecution was tainted by references to unrelated fraud. Alan Joseph exchanged cash for Bitcoin. In undercover meetings, an agent presented himself as a seller of counterfeit designer goods who needed Bitcoin to pay a supplier. Prosecutors said Joseph knew what those transactions were meant to support. A jury convicted him of money laundering and operating an unregistered money-transmitting business. The jury acquitted him on one other laundering count. The appeal concerns trial testimony about romance scams and cryptocurrency investment fraud, not charges that Joseph ran those schemes. His lawyer will argue that these references portrayed him as a habitual criminal and denied him a fair trial. This is a propensity concern: treating someone's supposed criminal character as proof of the charged conduct. The government will acknowledge that some fraud references were unnecessary, but will argue that the judge's warnings kept jurors focused on the actual charges. A limiting instruction tells jurors how they may use particular evidence. The government will also point to the undercover evidence and the mixed verdict. Even if testimony should have been excluded, the court must consider whether it affected the verdict. That is the harmless-error question at the heart of this appeal.

United States v. Joseph (No. 25-1610) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official First Circuit recording:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/25-1610_20261102.mp3

Case and argument date — First Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11

Case background and convictions — U.S. Attorney's Office, November 25, 2024:
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/lancaster-man-convicted-money-laundering-and-operating-unlawful-money-transmission

Original allegations and undercover transactions — U.S. Attorney's Office, March 4, 2021:
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/fitchburg-man-charged-money-laundering-and-illegal-money-transmission-converting-cash

Unfair prejudice — Federal Rule of Evidence 403:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_403

Character and propensity evidence — Federal Rule of Evidence 404:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_404

Limiting instructions — Federal Rule of Evidence 105:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_105

Harmless error — Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a):
https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_52

The First Circuit considers whether a defense lawyer's failure to challenge a phone search undermined a murder conviction. Felix Melendez was convicted in Massachusetts after two earlier juries failed to agree on the murder charge. Prosecutors linked him to the victim's jewelry, some of which he had pawned, and used material from his phone to support their account of his motive and conduct. His trial lawyer did not seek suppression of those phone contents on constitutional grounds. The state's highest court later found that the search-warrant affidavit did not connect the phone to the crime. It nevertheless upheld the conviction, relying on other evidence. Melendez now seeks federal habeas relief, a challenge to the legality of his imprisonment. His lawyer will argue that asking whether the remaining evidence could support a conviction is different from asking whether the lawyer's error creates a reasonable probability of a different result. That probability must be enough to undermine confidence in the verdict; acquittal need not be more likely than not. The state will defend the ruling, arguing that the state court's review adequately protected his federal rights. The judges will also explore exhaustion: whether the state courts had a fair opportunity to decide the federal constitutional claim before it reached federal court. Federal law generally requires that opportunity and gives substantial deference to state decisions resolving federal claims on their merits.

Melendez v. Kennedy (No. 25-2151) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official First Circuit recording:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/25-2151_20261102.mp3

Case and argument date — First Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11

Case background and phone-search ruling — Commonwealth v. Melendez, 490 Mass. 648 (2022):
https://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/volumes/490/490mass648.html

Ineffective-assistance prejudice standard — Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694–696 (1984):
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/466/668/

Federal habeas, exhaustion and deference — 28 U.S.C. § 2254:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/2254

Damilola Kumapayi challenges the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to a wire-fraud conspiracy. The broader prosecution involved romance scams, fraudulent unemployment claims, and moving the proceeds through bank accounts. He received one hundred nine months in prison. His guilty plea distinguishes him from co-defendants who went to trial. To follow the argument, it helps to separate several legal questions. An appeal waiver is a promise in a plea agreement to give up certain appeals. In Hunter versus the United States, the Supreme Court recognized a narrow exception for sentencing errors so egregious that enforcing the waiver would undermine the justice system's integrity. Ordinary disagreements over sentencing calculations do not meet that standard. A separate question is harmless error: a procedural mistake does not require reversal if it did not affect substantial rights. You will also hear about the presentence report, or PSR, prepared by a probation officer to help the judge determine the sentence. It can contain sentencing calculations and information about victims' losses. Restitution is money ordered repaid to victims for legally attributable losses, not simply a measure of how much a defendant personally kept. Keep those questions distinct as you listen: whether an appeal can proceed, whether a sentencing error warrants correction, and what losses the law permits the judge to charge to the defendant.

United States v. Damilola Kumapayi (No. 25-40379) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official Fifth Circuit recording:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/25/25-40379_11-02-2026.mp3

Case and argument date — Fifth Circuit official recording archive:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/results?from=2026-08-01&to=2026-11-03

Plea, sentence and broader scheme — U.S. Attorney's Office sentencing release, June 16, 2025:
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edtx/pr/conspirators-sentenced-engaging-multitude-fraud-schemes-including-romance-scams

Appeal-waiver exception — Hunter v. United States, June 18, 2026:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1063new_l5gm.pdf

Fifth Circuit application of Hunter — United States v. London, August 21, 2026:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/25/25-20102-CR0.pdf

Presentence reports — Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_32

Harmless error — Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_52

Victim restitution — 18 U.S.C. 3663A:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3663A

A Texas city and environmental groups challenge renewed federal approval of the Rio Grande liquefied natural gas terminal and its supply pipeline in South Texas. The developer had proposed adding carbon capture and sequestration: collecting carbon dioxide from the terminal and storing it underground. The proposal referred to storage sites close to the terminal. In an earlier appeal, the court required the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or FERC, to examine that proposal even if the developer withdrew its application. The developer did withdraw it, and FERC reaffirmed approval after a supplemental environmental review. FERC declined to recommend carbon capture, citing uncertainties over permitting, timing, cost, and infrastructure. The challengers will argue that evaluating a storage site about a hundred miles away did not answer whether the nearby option was workable. FERC and the project companies will defend that investigation and the agency's discretion to decide which alternatives are feasible. You will hear NEPA, the National Environmental Policy Act, which requires environmental review rather than a particular environmental outcome. Another dispute concerns a sixth liquefaction train, meaning a gas-processing production line, not a railroad train. The challengers say its effects should have been evaluated with the approved project. FERC says there was no pending expansion proposal at the relevant time. This raises segmentation: whether treating parts of a larger undertaking separately improperly obscures its environmental effects. The judges will examine how the agency's discretion fits with their earlier remand, or instructions sending the matter back to FERC.

South Texas Environmental Justice Network v. FERC (No. 25-1284) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official D.C. Circuit recording:
https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/docs/2026/11/25-1284.mp3

Case and argument date — D.C. Circuit official November 2026 archive:
https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/bydate/2026/11

FERC order addressing rehearing arguments — March 19, 2026:
https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2026-03/C-1-CP16-454-009.pdf

Prior court opinion — City of Port Isabel v. FERC, August 6, 2024 (remedy later modified):
https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2024/08/23-1174-2068430.pdf

Petitioners' request for agency rehearing — September 29, 2025:
https://earthjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/sotxejn-et-al-request-for-rehearing-re-rio-grande-lng.pdf

Honda and Tesla challenge a Patent Office decision concerning Neo Wireless's patent for organizing wireless transmissions. Think of the available transmission capacity as a grid with time on one axis and frequency on the other. The patent describes arranging data streams into resource segments, aiming to reduce the control information needed to tell devices where their data begins. After automakers challenged the patent, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found they had not proved the challenged claims unpatentable. A central issue is the meaning of starting time-frequency coordinate: whether separate time and frequency values can satisfy that language. The board relied partly on arguments Neo had made in an earlier Patent Office challenge brought by Dell. You'll hear prosecution disclaimer, the rule that a patent owner's clear and unmistakable statements to the Patent Office can narrow the scope of its claims. This is claim construction, interpreting the words that define patent protection, rather than physically changing the invention. The challengers' lawyer will argue that the board applied that narrowing incorrectly and should reconsider the earlier technical disclosures, called prior art. Neo's lawyer will defend the interpretation and the board's findings. The judges will also explore whether the patent itself supports the same interpretation and whether the challengers properly preserved their separate attack on the prior-art analysis.

American Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Neo Wireless LLC (No. 25-1354) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording:
https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-1354_11022026.mp3

Case and argument date — Federal Circuit official recording archive, November 2, 2026:
https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/

Patent specification — U.S. Patent No. 10,447,450 B2:
https://patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/d5/32/90/abf0661270033e/US10447450.pdf

Board final written decision — IPR2022-01567, Paper 59, November 1, 2024:
https://ptacts.uspto.gov/ptacts/public-informations/petitions/1553858/download-documents?artifactId=ZdirWU30L_8UYaOOEHp4bgVm2GlcvRQ_g_ath-dveoOUZgLjDDnREaw

Honda notice of appeal — January 2, 2025:
https://ptacts.uspto.gov/ptacts/public-informations/petitions/1550343/download-documents?artifactId=MHLdrPvy3ho0pDORGZ7ZU1_LcCbP5Keg7j92VXbS1wwIvGiyPqtuHSE

The Fifth Circuit considers Charles Ray Keys' challenge to drug and firearm convictions arising from a New Orleans house search. Investigators were looking into a child's fentanyl death connected to the property. A later search uncovered cocaine, fentanyl and guns. A jury convicted Keys of possessing drugs with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The central dispute concerns the sworn statement used to obtain the search warrant. A local detective signed it, but an FBI agent supplied much of the underlying investigation. Several statements incorrectly credited the detective with investigative steps. The trial judge allowed the evidence, finding no intent to mislead or reckless disregard for the truth. Keys' lawyer will argue that the misstatements undermined the warrant; the government will defend the ruling and argue that sufficient grounds for the search remained. Under Franks, deliberate or reckless falsehoods can invalidate a warrant if the remaining facts do not establish probable cause. The lawyers will also dispute constructive possession: whether Keys had control over the drugs and guns, even without holding them. Sentencing questions involve the Armed Career Criminal Act, which increases penalties for defendants with certain qualifying prior convictions.

United States v. Charles Ray Keys (No. 25-30664) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official Fifth Circuit recording:
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/25/25-30664_11-2-2026.mp3

Case and argument date — Fifth Circuit official calendar, November 2, 2026:
https://www-dev.ca5.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-information/court-calendars/Details/1982/

Search background and warrant ruling — district court Doc. 56, April 7, 2025:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-laed-2_24-cr-00137/pdf/USCOURTS-laed-2_24-cr-00137-0.pdf

Trial and Armed Career Criminal Act ruling — district court Doc. 102, June 2, 2025:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-laed-2_24-cr-00137/pdf/USCOURTS-laed-2_24-cr-00137-1.pdf

Trial evidence and constructive possession — district court Doc. 104, filed June 9, 2025:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-laed-2_24-cr-00137/pdf/USCOURTS-laed-2_24-cr-00137-2.pdf

The Federal Circuit reviews Jefferson Street Holdings' patent for a protective phone case. The patent describes higher corners and lower side sections, intended to protect the screen while leaving it easier to reach. After reexamining the issued patent against earlier case designs, the Patent Office's appeal board upheld rejections of its claims. A patent claim defines the features the patent seeks to protect. Here, much turns on whether a height that continuously spans a side must stay constant, as the company contends, or can vary while remaining above zero, as the board concluded. The lawyers will also dispute whether curved edges satisfy requirements about extending perpendicular, or at right angles, to the back panel. You'll hear two different patentability tests. Anticipation asks whether one earlier reference already disclosed every claimed feature in the required arrangement. Obviousness asks whether the claimed design, as a whole, would have been obvious to someone with ordinary skill in the field. Different claims were rejected on different grounds, so winning one interpretation issue would not necessarily resolve them all. Jefferson Street will seek relief from those rejections; the Patent Office will defend the board's analysis.

In re Jefferson Street Holdings LLC (No. 25-2037) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official Federal Circuit recording:
https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-arguments/25-2037_11022026.mp3

Case and argument date — Federal Circuit official recording archive, November 2, 2026:
https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments/

Patent specification and claims — U.S. Patent No. 10,820,675 B2:
https://patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/25/29/ea/0725c3d0f093b7/US10820675.pdf

Board decision — PTAB Appeal 2025-000826, reproduced by CaseMine:
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/68872442778e584c8de8dd34

Claim interpretation — USPTO Manual § 2111:
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2111.html

Anticipation — USPTO Manual § 2131:
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2131.html

Obviousness — USPTO Manual § 2141:
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2141.html

The D.C. Circuit reviews a defamation verdict over a confidential report. Businessman Christopher Chandler sued a private investigator and his company over a 2003 report accusing Chandler of money laundering. Chandler denied the allegations, and said he first saw the report when British journalists showed it to him in 2018. The report had originally gone to a client; years later, its contents appeared in the British press. An earlier appeal allowed the claim over the investigator's original publication to proceed, but barred damages for the later British-media republication. A jury later awarded Chandler about eight million dollars. In defamation law, publication means communicating a statement to someone else, not necessarily printing it in a newspaper. The damages dispute concerns which harm came from the original circulation rather than the excluded media coverage. You'll also hear about presumed damages: compensation for reputational injury without proving a specific financial loss. The discovery rule asks when Chandler knew, or reasonably should have known, of injury from the investigator's wrongdoing. Jim Campbell will argue for the investigator and his company; Daniel Watkins will defend Chandler's verdict.

Christopher Chandler v. Donald Berlin (No. 26-7008) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official D.C. Circuit recording:
https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/docs/2026/11/26-7008.mp3

Case, argument date and advocates — official court listing, November 2, 2026:
https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/bydate/2026/11

Earlier appeal and factual background — Chandler v. Berlin, May 28, 2021:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-caDC-20-07020/pdf/USCOURTS-caDC-20-07020-0.pdf

District court background and defamation principles — September 5, 2023 opinion, reproduced by Midpage:
https://app.midpage.ai/document/chandler-v-berlin-1000370721785

Trial verdict — October 23, 2024 first-party report by Chandler's trial counsel:
https://www.mwpp.com/news-stories/meier-watkins-phillips-pusch-llp-secures-8-million-defamation-verdict-for-philanthropist-and-investor-christopher-chandler

The First Circuit considers whether a murder defendant was denied a fair opportunity to present his defense. A 1994 Massachusetts shooting killed one man and injured another. Jermaine Celester was convicted of second-degree murder at a retrial. His defense was that someone in a passing car fired the shots. Jurors heard evidence about the car and two occupants fleeing police. But the judge excluded the occupants' identities, their relationships with the victims, and conflicting accounts of their whereabouts. Celester says those details would have supported his claim that someone else was responsible. After state courts upheld his conviction, a federal judge denied his habeas petition, a challenge to the legality of his imprisonment. He now appeals that denial. His lawyer will argue that excluding the evidence undermined his only defense. The state will defend the ruling as a reasonable response to speculation. Federal habeas review is not an ordinary appeal of an evidence ruling; it gives state-court decisions substantial deference. The central question is whether the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law protecting the opportunity to present a defense.

Celester v. Lynds (No. 23-1973) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official First Circuit recording:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/23-1973_20261102.mp3

Argument date and case — First Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11

District court decision and case background — October 24, 2023, Doc. 35:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-mad-1_21-cv-11523/pdf/USCOURTS-mad-1_21-cv-11523-0.pdf

A pregnancy-discrimination lawsuit becomes a Supreme Court dispute about a defense raised late. Jasmine Younge served as deputy chief of staff and director of policy and programs for the elected district attorney in Fulton County, Georgia. She says she was fired two weeks after announcing her pregnancy and sued under Title Seven, the federal employment-discrimination law. The office later invoked the personal-staff exception to that law's definition of employee, saying her senior role put her outside its coverage. That defense was missing from the office's answer, its formal response to her complaint. After discovery, the evidence-gathering stage, the office raised it and later sought summary judgment: a ruling without trial. The lower courts allowed the defense, finding that the delay had not unfairly harmed Younge's case, and ruled against her. The Supreme Court is examining that procedural ruling, not deciding whether pregnancy discrimination occurred. An affirmative defense supplies a separate legal reason to defeat a claim. Prejudice here means unfair litigation harm, not personal bias. Eric Schnapper will ask the Court to require the normal standards for amending an answer, including good cause when scheduling rules apply. Stephen Petrany will defend the office's position that a late legal defense is permissible when nothing material could have changed.

Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office (No. 25-352) — Supreme Court of the United States, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official Supreme Court recording:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/media/audio/mp3files/25-352.mp3

Official transcript and speaking counsel — November 2, 2026:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2026/25-352_p8k0.pdf

Case, granted question and counsel — Supreme Court docket No. 25-352:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/25-352.html

Facts, Title VII coverage and procedural rulings — Eleventh Circuit opinion, April 1, 2025:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-352/368820/20250804175508953_YoungeOpinionsPDF.pdf

Younge's allegations and amendment argument — petitioner merits brief:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-352/412882/20260608170007524_25-352%20Brief.pdf

Office's coverage and prejudice argument — respondent merits brief:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25/25-352/418311/20260806134746085_25-352%20bs.pdf

Discovery and summary judgment — U.S. Courts legal glossary:
https://www.uscourts.gov/glossary

A fight over a Rhode Island pond has become a fight over which court gets to decide its price. In 2024, Coventry took Johnson's Pond, its dam, and nearby land from private owners through eminent domain: the government's power to acquire private property for public use with just compensation. The town deposited an estimated one hundred fifty-seven thousand dollars in state court. Soscia Holdings and related companies later sued in federal court for compensation and other damages; they no longer seek to undo the taking. A federal judge halted the state-court compensation proceedings, and the town appealed. The owners rely on Knick, a Supreme Court decision allowing federal takings claims without first litigating for compensation in state court. The question here is whether that access to federal court also justifies stopping the state case. A state compensation judgment might bind the federal court, a concern called preclusion. You'll also hear about abstention: circumstances in which a federal court steps aside despite having authority to hear a case. Nicole Benjamin will argue for the town and its officials. Greg Estabrooks will defend the owners' federal forum.

Soscia Holdings, LLC v. Town of Coventry (No. 26-1272) — U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued November 2, 2026.

Sources:

Argument audio — official First Circuit recording (ends during the marshal's administrative adjournment, after all advocacy):
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/oralargs/26-1272_20261102.mp3

Argument date and case — First Circuit official listing, November 2, 2026:
https://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/doar/results/2026-11

District court injunction and background — March 12, 2026, Doc. 60:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-rid-1_25-cv-00274/pdf/USCOURTS-rid-1_25-cv-00274-1.pdf

State condemnation proceedings — Kent County Superior Court, November 7, 2025:
https://cases.justia.com/rhode-island/superior-court/2025-24-578.pdf?ts=1762554705

Appellate docket and counsel appearances — No. 26-1272:
https://dockets.justia.com/docket/circuit-courts/ca1/26-1272