SCOTUS Oral Arguments

Docket Links:

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC SCHNAPPER

(00:53:51) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC SCHNAPPER

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Nov 2, 2026 56 min

Maxwell v. Dinis

Show notes

Maxwell v. Dinis, No. 25-5930

Argued on Nov 02 2026.

For petitioner: Masha G. Hansford, Washington, D. C. For respondent supporting vacatur: Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Brian W. Barnes, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

In 2020 Maxwell sought transfer to halfway house or home confinement under the First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. §3624(g), 18 U.S.C. §3621(b) and §3621(h), the CARES Act of 2020, 18 U.S.C. §3624(c), the Second Chance Act of 2018 reauthorized by the First Step Act of 2018, 34 U.S.C. §60541, and Compassionate Release. The Warden only addressed Maxwell's CARES Act request and denied relief. The warden otherwise ignored all Maxwell's other explicitly pled issues. Maxwell, after exhausting his administrative remedies proceeded in Court, filing a §2241 habeas. The U.S.D.C. dismissed alleging Maxwell failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for First Step Act relief. Maxwell appealed the decision of the U.S.D.C. to the Fifth Circuit. Sua sponte, the Fifth Circuit held, contrary to this Court ’ s decision in Jones v. Hendrix, 216 L.Ed.2d 471, 484 (2022), and contrary to nine other Courts of Appeal -- see Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2025); Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2001); Hernandez v, Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hutchins, 835 F.2d 185, 186 (8th Cir, 1987); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 865 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Little, 392 F.3d 671, 678- 79 (4th Cir. 2024); McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus. - Suncoast, 851 F.3d 1076, 1092-93 (11th Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 50 n.10 (1st Cir. 1999); and Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998) --that its bright-line rule adopted in Melot v. Bergomi, 970 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020) controlled. There the Fifth Circuit held that unless a favorable determination of the prisoner's claim would not automatically entitle him to accelerated release from his sentence, then the proper vehicle is a civil rights suit. The Fifth Circuit dismissed. I. The question for this Court is whether disputes regarding the calculation of an inmate's earned First Step Act time credits, enabling the inmate to transfer into halfway house or home confinement earlier, similar to parole, are actionable under 28 U.S.C. §2241, II. The question for this Court is whether, given all the obstruction of the administrative remedy process that took place in this case, under Perttu v. Richards, exhaustion of administrative remedies is interwoven into the underlying claims themselves, creating a fact issue for a jury, and whether the trial court must make that determination in the first instance LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-40699 THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER A CLAIM REGARDING APPLICATION OF TIME CREDITS UNDER THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018, 132 STAT. 5195 – 5208 (CODIFIED IN RELEVANT PART AT 18 U. S. C. §§ 3631 – 3635), SEEKING ACCELERATED TRANSFER TO A HALFWAY HOUSE OR HOME CONFINEMENT, CAN BE BROUGHT IN A HABEAS PETITION UNDER 28 U. S. C. § 2241. ORDER OF June 16, 2026: BRIAN W. BARNES, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW. CERT. GRANTED 6/1/

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MASHA G. HANSFORD

(00:15:58) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN J. BARBER

(00:38:22) ORAL ARGUMENT OF BRIAN W. BARNES,

(01:01:49) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MASHA G. HANSFORD

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Nov 2, 2026 1 hr 4 min

Salazar v. Paramount Global

Show notes

Salazar v. Paramount Global, No. 25-459

Argued on Oct 14 2026.

For petitioner: Joshua I. Hammack, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.

Question Presented:

The Video Privacy Protection Act (“ VPPA ”) contains a one-sentence liability clause. It prohibits a “ video tape service provider ” from “ knowingly disclos[ing], to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider. ” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1). The statute defines “ consumer ” broadly to include a “ subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider. ” Id. § 2710(a)(1). It defines “ personally identifiable information ” to include information that “ identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider. ” Id. § 2710(a)(3). And it defines “ video tape service provider ” to include those in the business of delivering audiovisual materials. Id . § 2710(a)(4). Paramount is a “ video tape service provider. ” Both courts below assumed as much. Michael Salazar subscribed to Paramount ’ s online newsletter, which he used to view videos. Paramount then disclosed Mr. Salazar ’ s Facebook ID and his video-watching history to Facebook. That information counts as “ personally identifiable information. ” Again, both courts below assumed as much. The question here is whether the phrase “ goods or services from a video tape service provider, ” as used in the VPPA ’ s definition of “ consumer, ” refers to all of a video tape service provider ’ s goods or services or only to its audiovisual goods or services.

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOSHUA I. HAMMACK

(00:38:03) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT

(01:21:37) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JOSHUA I. HAMMACK

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Oct 14, 2026 1 hr 25 min

Beaird v. United States

Show notes

Beaird v. United States, No. 25-5343

Argued on Oct 13 2026.

For petitioner: Kevin Joel Page, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Dallas, Tex. For respondent in support of vacatur: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For Court-appointed amicus curiae: Anthony J. Dick, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

I. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment? II. Whether Stinson v. United States still accurately state the level of deference due to the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines? III. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) permits conviction for the possession of any firearm that has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, if it is facially unconstitutional?

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN JOEL PAGE

(00:44:47) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC J. FEIGIN

(01:23:40) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ANTHONY J. DICK,

(01:51:05) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN JOEL PAGE

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Oct 13, 2026 1 hr 54 min

Department of Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan

Show notes

Department of Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan, No. 25-579

Argued on Oct 07 2026.

For petitioners: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Caroline A. Flynn, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq ., is a comprehensive environmental statute providing for cradle-to-grave regulation of hazardous waste through a scheme of cooperative federalism. Under RCRA, the United States Environmental Protection Agency may authorize state and territorial regulators to administer permitting programs for hazardous-waste-treatment facilities in their respective jurisdictions, including facilities operated by the federal government. The questions presented are as follows: 1. Whether the federal government's submission to a state or territorial regulator of an application to renew a RCRA permit is "final agency action" that is immediately reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704. 2. Whether the federal government must comply with the general environmental- review procedures of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq ., before submitting a permit-renewal application under RCRA, which sets forth its own specific procedures to review environmental impacts in the context of hazardous-waste treatment.

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:04) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SOPAN JOSHI

(00:37:47) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CAROLINE A. FLYNN

(01:12:10) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF SOPAN JOSHI

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Oct 7, 2026 1 hr 16 min

Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee

Show notes

Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee, No. 25-498

Argued on Oct 06 2026.

For petitioners: Matthew W.H. Wessler, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D. C.; and Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), a plan fiduciary is subject to a "[p]rudent man standard of care," which requires the fiduciary to "discharge his duties with respect to a plan" with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that a prudent person "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1)). As this Court has recognized, a court's inquiry into whether a plaintiff has adequately alleged that a fiduciary breached ERISA's duty of prudence "will necessarily be context specific" because the content of that duty "turns on 'the circumstances ... prevailing' at the time the fiduciary acts." Fifth Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoeffer , 573 U.S. 409, 425 (2014) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)). As a result, "categorical" pleading rules are "inconsistent with the context-specific inquiry that ERISA requires." Hughes v. Nw. Univ ., 595 U.S.170, 173 (2022). The question presented is: Whether, for claims predicated on fund underperformance, pleading that an ERISA fiduciary failed to use the requisite "care, skill, prudence, or diligence" under the circumstances and thus breached ERISA's duty of prudence when investing plan assets requires alleging a "meaningful benchmark."

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MATTHEW W.H. WESSLER

(00:33:51) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES L. McCLOUD

(00:50:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF AIMEE BROWN

(00:59:19) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MATTHEW W.H. WESSLER

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Oct 6, 2026 1 hr 1 min

Johnson v. United States Congress

Show notes

Johnson v. United States Congress, No. 25-735

Argued on Oct 05 2026.

For petitioner: Jeffrey W. Chen, Atlanta, Ga. For respondent: Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Did the Veterans' Judicial Review Act strip district courts of the jurisdiction, recognized by this Court in Johnson v. Robison , 415 U.S. 361 (1974), to hear challenges to the constitutionality of acts of Congress affecting veterans' benefits?

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:08) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY W. CHEN

(00:33:15) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN J. BARBER

(01:02:18) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY W. CHEN

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Oct 5, 2026 1 hr 7 min

Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Commissioners of Boulder County

Show notes

Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Commissioners of Boulder County, No. 25-170

Argued on Oct 05 2026.

For petitioners: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D. C.; and Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Kevin K. Russell, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

BY THE PETITION, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THIS COURT HAS STATUTORY AND ARTICLE III JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS CASE. SEPTEMBER 28, 2026: JUSTICE ALITO WILL NOT CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CASE. CERT. GRANTED 2/23/2026 QUESTION PRESENTED: Whether federal law precludes state-law claims seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate.

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Cert. Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

(00:51:26) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SARAH M. HARRIS

(01:11:34) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KEVIN K. RUSSELL

(01:43:42) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

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Oct 5, 2026 1 hr 47 min

Mullin, Sec. of Homeland Security v. Doe

Show notes

Mullin, Sec. of Homeland Security v. Doe, No. 25-1083

Argued on Apr 29 2026.

For petitioners: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents in 25-1083: Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Los Angeles, Cal. For respondents in 25-1084: Geoffrey M. Pipoly, Chicago, Ill. VIDED.

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUER

(00:44:09) ORAL ARGUMENT OF AHILAN T. ARULANANTHAM

(01:24:25) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEOFFREY M. PIPOLY

(01:43:11) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUER

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Apr 29, 2026 1 hr 46 min

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc.

Show notes

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., No. 24-889

Argued on Apr 29 2026.

For petitioners: Charles B. Klein, Washington, D. C.; and Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Michael R. Huston, Phoenix, Ariz.

Question Presented:

Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act "[t]o facilitate the approval of generic drugs as soon as patents allow." Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S , 566 U.S. 399, 405 (2012). Recognizing that many drugs are approved for both patented and unpatented uses, Congress sought to ensure "that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug for other unpatented ones." Id . at 415. The statutory mechanism is a "skinny label": Generic drugmakers "carve out" patented uses from their labels, leaving only instructions to use generic drugs for their unpatented uses. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii). Congress designed this carve-out mechanism to encourage competition and to protect generic drugmakers from allegations that marketing a generic drug for an unpatented use "actively induces infringement." 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). After all, active inducement requires "clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement"-there is no "liability when a defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use." Metro-Goldwyn- Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. , 545 U.S. 913, 936-937 & n.11 (2005). The questions presented are: 1. When a generic drug label fully carves out a patented use, are allegations that the generic drugmaker calls its product a "generic version" and cites public information about the branded drug (e.g., sales) enough to plead induced infringement of the patented use? 2. Does a complaint state a claim for induced infringement of a patented method if it does not allege any instruction or other statement by the defendant that encourages, or even mentions, the patented use?

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Cert. Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES B. KLEIN

(00:11:20) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART

(00:28:12) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL R. HUSTON

(00:57:08) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES B. KLEIN

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Apr 29, 2026 1 hr

Cisco Systems v. Doe I

Show notes

Cisco Systems v. Doe I, No. 24-856

Argued on Apr 28 2026.

For petitioners: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D. C.; and Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Paul L. Hoffman, Hermosa Beach, Cal.

Question Presented:

1. Whether the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows a judicially-implied private right of action for aiding and abetting. 2. Whether, if ATS aiding-and-abetting claims are cognizable, mere knowledge rather than purpose suffices to show the requisite mens rea. 3. Whether the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, allows a judicially- implied private right of action for aiding and abetting.

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Cert. Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

(00:37:14) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CURTIS E. GANNON

(01:17:50) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL L. HOFFMAN

(01:53:58) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

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Apr 28, 2026 1 hr 57 min

Monsanto Co. v. Durnell

Show notes

Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, No. 24-1068

Argued on Apr 27 2026.

For petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.; and Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondent: Ashley C. Keller, Chicago, Ill.

Question Presented:

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA'') creates a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the use, sale, and labeling of pesticides. The Act preempts any state "requirement[] for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under" FIFRA. 7 U.S.C. §136v(b). For decades, EPA has exercised its authority under FIFRA to find that Monsanto's Roundup product line and its active ingredient, glyphosate, do not cause cancer in humans. Consistent with that understanding, EPA has repeatedly approved Roundup's label without a cancer warning. FIFRA prohibits Monsanto from making any substantive change to an EPA-approved label unless it first obtains EPA's permission. Respondent is one of more than 100,000 plaintiffs across the country that nonetheless seek to hold Monsanto liable for not warning users that glyphosate, the active ingredient in Roundup, causes cancer. The federal courts of appeals and state appellate courts are divided over whether FIFRA preempts such claims. The Third Circuit has held that it does. In the decision below, the Missouri Court of Appeals joined the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and state appellate courts in California and Oregon in holding that it does not. The question presented is: Whether FIFRA preempts a state-law failure-to- warn claim where EPA has repeatedly concluded that the warning is not required and the warning cannot be added to a product without EPA approval.

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Cert. Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT

(00:36:40) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SARAH M. HARRIS

(00:51:42) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ASHLEY C. KELLER

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Apr 27, 2026 1 hr 14 min

Chatrie v. United States

Show notes

Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112

Argued on Apr 27 2026.

For petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

This case concerns the constitutionality of geofence warrants. For cell phone users to use certain services, their cell phones must continuously transmit their exact locations to their service providers. A geofence warrant allows law enforcement to obtain, from the service provider, the identities of users who were in the vicinity of a particular location at a particular time. In this case, law enforcement obtained, and served on Google, a geofence warrant seeking anonymized location data for every device within 150 meters of the location of a bank robbery within one hour of the robbery. After Google returned an initial list, law enforcement sought - without seeking an additional warrant - information about the movements of certain devices for a longer, two-hour period, and Google complied with that request as well. Then - again without seeking an additional warrant-law enforcement requested de-anonymized subscriber information for three devices. One of those devices belonged to petitioner Okello Chatrie. Based on the evidence derived from the geofence warrant, petitioner was convicted of armed robbery. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the execution of the geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. 2. Whether the exclusionary rule should apply to the evidence derived from the geofence warrant.

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ADAM G. UNIKOWSKY

(00:57:11) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC J. FEIGIN

(01:55:14) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ADAM G. UNIKOWSKY

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Apr 27, 2026 2 hr

Blanche, Acting Atty Gen. v. Lau

Show notes

Blanche, Acting Atty Gen. v. Lau, No. 25-429

Argued on Apr 22 2026.

For petitioner: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a), various categories of aliens, including those who have committed or been convicted of certain crimes, are "ineligible to be admitted to the United States" and subject to removal. 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2); see 8 U.S.C. 1229a. Under 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(13)(C), a lawful permanent resident (LPR) who is returning to the United States after a trip abroad is generally not "regarded as seeking an admission into the United States" and is therefore not typically subject to the inadmissibility grounds in Section 1182(a). But that general rule does not apply to an LPR who "has committed an offense identified in section 1182 (a)(2)" i.e ., an offense that would render him inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C)(v). The question presented is: Whether, to remove an LPR who committed an offense listed in Section 1182(a)(2) and was subsequently paroled into the United States, the government must prove that it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the offense at the time of the LPR's last reentry into the United States.

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SOPAN JOSHI

(00:50:21) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SHAY DVORETZKY

(01:24:17) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF SOPAN JOSHI

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Apr 22, 2026 1 hr 30 min

FCC v. AT&T

Show notes

FCC v. AT&T, No. 25-406

Argued on Apr 21 2026.

For AT&T, Inc. and Verizon Communications Inc.: Jeffrey B. Wall, Washington, D. C. For FCC, et al.: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. VIDED.

Question Presented:

The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq ., empowers the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to assess monetary forfeiture penalties for certain violations of the Act or the FCC's regulations by issuing a notice of apparent liability, giving the regulated party an opportunity to respond in writing, and then issuing a final decision. If the regulated party declines to pay and the government sues to collect the penalties, the regulated party is entitled to a de novo jury trial in a federal district court. Alternatively, the subject of an FCC forfeiture order may pay the monetary penalty and file a petition for review in a court of appeals, thereby triggering a judicial-review proceeding in which no jury is available. The question presented is as follows: Whether the Communications Act provisions that govern the FCC's assessment and enforcement of monetary forfeitures are consistent with the Seventh Amendment and Article III.

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Petitioner's Opening Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY B. WALL

(00:53:41) ORAL ARGUMENT OF VIVEK SURI

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Apr 21, 2026 1 hr 25 min

Sripetch v. SEC

Show notes

Sripetch v. SEC, No. 25-466

Argued on Apr 20 2026.

For petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex. For respondent: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

This case presents a clear and acknowledged conflict over an exceptionally important question regarding the SEC's civil-enforcement power. In Liu v. SEC, 591 U.S. 71 (2020), this Court held the SEC may seek equitable "disgorgement" in civil-enforcement actions if an award "does not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits" and "is awarded for victims ." 591 U.S. at 74- 75 (emphasis added). In the proceedings below, the Ninth Circuit held that investors can be ''victims" for disgorgement purposes despite not suffering pecuniary harm. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit recognized a direct "split" on this question, "reject[ed] the reasoning of the Second Circuit," and "joined the First Circuit in holding that a finding of pecuniary harm is not required." This statutory holding was the sole basis of the Ninth Circuit's decision, and it leaves the SEC's enforcement power in disarray: disgorgement requests are ubiquitous in SEC actions, and there are now conflicting rules in the two main circuits (the Second and Ninth) where enforcement actions are most prominent. There are millions (if not billions) of dollars at stake. The question presented is: Whether the SEC may seek equitable disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) without showing investors suffered pecuniary harm .

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF DANIEL L. GEYSER

(00:40:34) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART

(01:07:30) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF DANIEL L. GEYSER

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Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Apr 20, 2026 1 hr 11 min

T. M. v. Univ. of MD Medical Sys. Corp.

Show notes

T. M. v. Univ. of MD Medical Sys. Corp., No. 25-197

Argued on Apr 20 2026.

For petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can be triggered by a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court.

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

(00:40:46) ORAL ARGUMENT OF LISA S. BLATT

(00:58:24) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

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Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

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Apr 20, 2026 1 hr 2 min

Trump, President of U.S. v. Barbara

Show notes

Trump, President of U.S. v. Barbara, No. 25-365

Argued on Apr 01 2026.

For petitioners: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Cecillia D. Wang, San Francisco, Cal.

Question Presented:

The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that those "born * * * in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," are U.S. citizens. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. The Clause was adopted to confer citizenship on the newly freed slaves and their children, not on the children of aliens temporarily visiting the United States or of illegal aliens. On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 14,160, Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship , which restores the original meaning of the Citizenship Clause and provides, on a prospective basis only, that children of temporary visitors and illegal aliens are not U.S. citizens by birth. The Citizenship Order directs federal agencies not to issue or accept citizenship documents for such children born more than 30 days after the Order's effective date. The question presented is whether the Executive Order complies on its face with the Citizenship Clause and with 8 U.S.C. 1401(a), which codifies that Clause.

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUER

(01:09:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CECILLIA D. WANG

(02:05:11) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUER

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Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

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Apr 1, 2026 2 hr 9 min

Pitchford v. Cain

Show notes

Pitchford v. Cain, No. 24-7351

Argued on Mar 31 2026.

For petitioner: Joseph J. Perkovich, New York, N. Y. (Appointed by this Court.) For respondents: Scott G. Stewart, Solicitor General, Jackson, Miss.; and Emily M. Ferguson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

District Attorney Doug Evans convicted Terry Pitchford, aged 18 years at the time of the crime, of capital murder and secured a death verdict in the Grenada Circuit Court before Judge Joseph Loper on February 9, 2006, with the entirety of jury selection and opening arguments taking place on February 6. After direct and collateral reviews in state court, the Northern District of Mississippi granted habeas corpus relief upon concluding that the trial court failed to determine the plausibility of the prosecutor ’ s proffered reasons for peremptorily striking four Black venire members or otherwise consider the full circumstances bearing upon whether Mr. Evans ’ s reasons for striking any and each of these four venire members was pretextual and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In so doing, the District Court ruled the state supreme court ’ s reliance on its waiver jurisprudence improperly foreclosed consideration of pretext under Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Judge Loper implicitly made determinations for each of the four strikes, trial counsel waived argument of pretext, and the Supreme Court of Mississippi ’ s waiver jurisprudence comports with Batson. This opinion in Pitchford v. Cain confirmed the Fifth Circuit ’ s disavowal of earlier circuit jurisprudence recognizing, inter alia, that since Miller-El v. Dretke , 545 U.S. 231 (2005) ( Miller-El II ), capital petitioners had been unable to “ waive[] any Batson claim based on a comparison analysis, ” Woodward v. Epps , 580 F.3d 318, 338 (5th Cir. 2009), deepening the Fifth Circuit ’ s split, joined by two other circuits, with the majority of courts of appeals in the application of Batson . This petition presents the following questions: 1. Does clearly established federal law determined by this Court and applied in six other circuits require reversal of a state appellate court ’ s denial of relief from a capital prosecutor ’ s discriminatory exercise of four peremptory strikes against Black venire members wherein the trial court, for each of the four strikes, failed to determine “ the plausibility of the reason in light of all evidence with a bearing on it ”? Miller-El II , 545 U.S at 251–52. 2. Does Mississippi Supreme Court precedent, which deems waived on direct review arguments of pretext not stated in the trial record, defy this Court ’ s clearly established federal law under Batson ? 3. Does a finding of waiver on a trial record possessing Batson objections, defense counsel efforts to argue the objection, and the trial court ’ s express assurance the issues were preserved, constitute an unreasonable determination of facts? GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER, UNDER THE STANDARDS SET FORTH IN AEDPA, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT UNREASONABLY DETERMINED THAT PETITIONER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO REBUT THE PROSECUTOR'S ASSERTED RACE-NEUTRAL REASONS FOR EXERCISING PEREMPTORY STRIKES AGAINST FOUR BLACK JURORS. ORDER OF MARCH 30, 2026: THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IS GRANTED. CERT. GRANTED 12/15/

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links:

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:53:19) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SCOTT G. STEWART

(01:33:27) ORAL ARGUMENT OF EMILY M. FERGUSON

(01:47:21) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JOSEPH J. PERKOVICH

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Mar 31, 2026 1 hr 50 min

Abouammo v. United States

Show notes

Abouammo v. United States, No. 25-5146

Argued on Mar 30 2026.

For petitioner: Tobias S. Loss-Eaton, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

As part of an investigation into a scheme to disclose nonpublic Twitter account information to foreign actors, San Francisco-based FBI agents visited Petitioner Ahmad Abouammo at his home in Seattle. While they were there, Mr. Abouammo went upstairs and emailed them an allegedly falsified document. Mr. Abouammo's only interaction with the agents occurred in Seattle. A grand jury in the Northern District of California indicted Mr. Abouammo for (among other things) falsifying documents with the intent to impede an investigation. The parties then agreed to toll the statute of limitations for other uncharged offenses. On the day the tolling agreement expired, the government filed a superseding information adding various felony counts. Mr. Abouammo never waived prosecution by indictment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(b). Four months after the limitations period had expired, the government dismissed this placeholder information and replaced it with a superseding indictment containing the same charges. The questions presented are: 1. Whether venue is proper in a district where no offense conduct took place, so long as the statute's intent element "contemplates" effects that could occur there. 2. Whether a criminal information unaccompanied by a waiver of indictment is an "information charging a felony" that allows the government to unilaterally extend the statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3288.

Oral Argument Links:

Docket Links: